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Vickery: The Problem of Progression

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESSION*
WILLIAMS[ VICKREY* *

THE

MEANING OF PROGRESSION

In a literal and formal sense, progressive taxation is taxation that imposes
a rate that varies more than in proportion to the tax base. In a less precise
but more fundamental sense, progressive taxation is taxation that conforms to
a concept of ability to pay, which in turn is deemed to increase more than in
proportion to various cardinally measurable indicia of the individual's economic status. Since income is one of the most readily available indicators of
ability to pay, the income tax furnishes the great bulk of the progressive
element in most modern tax systems. Thus, progression generally tends to
be measured in terms of how the tax burden varies with income, regardless
of the fact that income is in many circumstances an imperfect and even misleading measure of ability to pay.
This is particularly so in cases where income is subject to fluctuation. A
pensioner aged eighty, living on an annuity of 10,000 dollars a year bought
with savings out of high income from past years, may be comfortably well
off and able to pay a substantial tax without hardship. His accruing income,
however, by any definition sufficiently rigorous and uniformly applicable to
serve as a satisfactory tax base, would be only a fraction of the 10,000 dollars
since much of the annuity must be considered a return of capital. By contrast,
a man of fifty living on a salary of 8,000 dollars a year might be considered
to have a much greater income, but a tax payment equal to the pensioner's
would impose a much greater hardship on the wage earner because of the
higher living expenses connected with his work and because of his need to
save for his own retirement. A general sales tax, possibly with food exempted,
might conform more accurately to the relative ability to pay of the two; but
if the progressivity of the tax is measured in terms of the relation between
tax and income, the sales tax would be termed regressive.
Over any broad range of economic status, however, the sales tax by itself
fails rather seriously to measure up to what most people feel is an appropriate
degree of progressiveness. This failure can be remedied by assessing a tax in
a graduated manner on the total consumption expenditure of individuals and
families. The ability to pay of individuals under such a tax would be related
to their level of expenditure or standard of living, the assumption being that
the more lavish the scale of expenditure the less the sacrifice in giving up part
of it. Indeed, a long line of economists starting with John Stuart Mill and
including Irving Fisher and Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills, have
held that the proper base for the principal progressive tax should be con*The helpful comments of Carl Shoup are gratefully acknowledged, without, of course,
any imputation of responsibility.
**B.S. 1935, Yale University; M.A. 1937, Ph.D. 1947, Columbia University; Professor of
Economics, Columbia University 1946-date; Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California 1967-1968.
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sumption expenditure, not income.' Earlier advocates were ready to accept
the income tax on the ground that it would be simpler to administer, but
more recent developments seem to indicate that at levels where itemization
of deductions is common, the differences might well be more in favor of the
expenditure tax than against it. At the very least, one should not regard
income as the only available base for progressive taxation.
Even if agreement can be reached as to the base against which progression
is to be measured, measuring the degree of progression in a given tax structure, or deciding upon a particular pattern of tax progression remains a
problem. One common way of measuring the progression of a tax or a tax system is by comparing the degree of economic inequality in the distribution of
the selected economic base as it is after the tax burden has been deducted
with what it would be before this deduction. The degree of inequality may
be defined for this purpose in terms of such measures as the Gini ratio2 or its
equivalent, the area between the Lorenz curve 3 and the diagonal line representing complete equality. This comparison may prove unreliable because
the progression of a given tax schedule, so measured, depends on the income
distribution to which it is applied and, at least for more extreme changes, the
measure produces results at variance with what seem to be normal evaluations
in the relative desirability of alternative income distributions. Suppose, for
example, that we are to distribute 1,100,000 dollars of net income after tax
among 100 persons, and that one tax schedule results in ten after-tax incomes
of 1,100 dollars and 90 of 12,100 dollars while another tax schedule results
in one income of 110,000 dollars and 99 of 10,000 dollars. Most persons, I
think, would express a significant preference for the latter result; indeed in
the former case there would be a strong likelihood that some relief, either
via public welfare, tax revision, or private charity would be proposed for
the ten individuals with incomes insufficient to maintain decency and health,
whereas the probability of action to redistribute part of the 110,000 dollar
4
income would seem much less likely. Yet the Gini ratio is .18 in both cases.

1. I. FISHER & H. FISHER, CONSTRUCrlVE INCOME TAXATION (1942) (contains an extensive
bibliography on the subject); A. MARSHALL, OFFICE PAPERS 338 (1926); J. S. MILL, PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. IV, ch. 11, §4, at 813-1180 (Ashley variorum ed. 1936); A.
PIcoU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 135-44 (1928); Mills, The Spendings Tax, 7 BULL. NAT'L
TAX ASS'N 18-20 (1921).
2. The Gini ratio may be defined as the ratio of (a) the mean of the absolute

differences in income between all pairs of income recipients, to (b) the mean income. See
note 4 infra.
3. The Lorenz curve is a curve through all points such that the abscissa measures the
per cent of total population having a specified economic status or worse, while the ordinate
measures the percentage of the total distribuend - income, expenditure, wealth - accruing
to this group. See note 4 infra.
4. There are 100 x 100 = 10,000 income differences (including the comparison of each

individual with himself) of which, in the first case 102 + 90' = 8200 are zero, and 10 x
90 x 2 = 1800 are $11,000, a mean difference of (8200 x 0 + 1800 x $11,000)/10,000
$1980; dividing by the mean income of $11,000 gives .18 as the Gini ratio. Similarly in the
second case the ratio is also .18:
{[(12 +
99') X 0 + (2 x 99) ($110,000 - $10,000)]/10,000) / ($I,100,000/100) = .18.
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For those who are uncertain whether any sufficiently objective meaning
can be attached to an expression of preference for one income distribution
rather than another, let me suggest the following gedanken-experiment:5
Suppose that, lined up on the docks of Plymouth, there are a number of
ships about to sail for various equivalently endowed regions of the New
World, offering participation in communities in which varying degrees of
redistributive taxation are to be employed, but which are in other respects
similar. Given at least some uncertainty concerning how productively your
own particular talents will fare in the new environment, so that a corresponding uncertainty exists as to what place you will eventually occupy on
the prospective income distribution, what type of redistribution would you
tend to prefer in making your choice among the various colonies? How would
this preference be altered by taking into consideration the types of individuals
that the various plans would attract? How would the decision be made
where there is no advance information at all as to which particular individuals
are more or less likely to succeed in the new environment? While many of
those who have some degree of confidence in their superior capabilities, even
as against a group selected in terms of their being attracted to such a venture,
may find it difficult to give full weight in any such evaluation to the possibility
of their eventually filling a menial role, even hypothetically, in such a situation, the concept may be an aid in developing some degree of objectivity in
the appraisal of income distributions.
The classical utilitarian view implies that some degree of redistribution
will be preferred, and that individuals will accept a somewhat lower average
expectation of income in return for a smaller degree of dispersion of incomes
or risk. This is, indeed, the reaction found every day in the securities market.
But one cannot preclude the presence of gambler's and adventurer's predilections, so that even if a completely egalitarian community could offer a
standard of living superior to any attainable in a more competitive community, the zest of the struggle would make a community where some have incomes of 6,000 dollars and some of 9,000 dollars preferable to one where all
have 10,000 dollars. Nor, at the other extreme, can one exclude the case
where the Jones's superiority is so painful that a community where income is
uniformly 6,000 dollars is preferred to one where most have 7,000 dollars and
a few have 10,000 dollars. However, in the former case one is tempted to
suggest that the otherwise egalitarian community should consider setting up
a gambling casino, if it can reconcile this with its moral philosophy, with
appropriate controls to prevent any of the gamblers from proceeding to a
point where their plight begins to prey on the sympathies of their neighbors.
The Lorenz curve in the first case consists of two straight lines connecting the comers
(0,0) and (1,1) of the unit square with the intermediate point (10/100, (10 x $1,100)/
$1,100,000) = (0.1, .01) representing the fact that the lowest 10% of the population get
1% of the income. The area of the triangle between this Lorenz curve and the diagonal
is 21 (0.1 - .01) = .045; this is exactly N of the value of the Gini ratio, which is, indeed, a
relationship that holds generally. The Lorenz curve for the second case has as its intermediate point (.99, .90); the area is obviously the same.
5. A hypothetical procedure the results of which, for practical reasons such as cost or
morality, cannot be determined by actually carrying it out, but can only be imagined.
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Or the egalitarian community might be able to find some means of permitting the adventurers to opt out of part or all of the redistributive system,
though how to do this without permitting adverse selection to operate may
be an insoluble problem. In the latter case we may, along with Sir Dennis
Robertson, call upon the Archbishop of Canterbury to do what he can to
exorcise the green-eyed monster.6
More relevantly, it seems fairly certain that the degree of inequality incidental to providing the incentives for maximum net productivity is currently
more than adequate to satisfy the predilections of the venturesome. Therefore,
once subjective bias based on the current status of the individual is removed,
there should be wide agreement that a substantial degree of progression is
appropriate. But exactly what degree must for the moment be left to the
vagaries of the political process, until someone manages to distill from observations of the behavior of investors in risky markets, individuals in other
risky situations, and estimates of the impact of impairment of incentives on
net productivity, some more objective standard for tax progression, striking
a balance between the maximization of the distribuend and the maximization
of the satisfaction derivable from a given distribuend. Until this is done,
and probably even afterwards, decisions as to income distribution remain, in
blunt terms, the resultant of a power struggle between the few who have
exceptional confidence in their own ability, or good fortune, and all the
others.
In the absence of such an analysis based on observation of individual
behavior in circumstances involving risk, there seems to be no generally
applicable measure that will yield acceptable comparisons between widely
differing scales of progression; yet one can seek to measure the degree of
progression existing at a given point along the scale. A measure that immediately suggests itself to economists is the elasticity of ex-tax income with
respect to pre-tax income, or the percentage increases in post-tax income associated with a one per cent increase in pre-tax income. If one adopts the
principle that the rate of progression so defined should be uniform over the
whole range of incomes, one is equipped with a rule that permits an entire
tax schedule to be determined, once the level of the exemption is decided
upon and either the initial marginal rate or the aggregate revenue to be
obtained is given.7 Too much should perhaps not be claimed for this standard of progression, but it is among the simpler, if not the simplest of the
formulas that can be applied over an unlimited range of incomes and used
to provide almost any degree of total tax burden required. It also has the
property that if a second tax is applied by such a formula to income remaining after a first such tax, the combined tax burden still conforms to the
formula. A further interesting, though perhaps not highly important, property is that if the income before tax is distributed according to the Pareto
6.
7.

Robertson, Utility and All What?, 64 ECON. J. 665-78 (1954).
Examples of the application of such a graduation formula are given in W. VICKRv,
AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 464 (1947). See also Edgeworth, Methods of Graduating
Taxes on Income and Capital, 29 EcoN. J, 133, 144 (1919). See APPENDIX, Table I, for
comparison of some of the formula-derived rates with the marginal rates of 1965.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss4/2

4

1968]

Vickery: The Problem of Progression

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESSION

law (which may be expressed by saying that every time income is increased
by a given percentage, the number of individuals having that income or
higher diminishes by another constant percentage) then income after tax is
also distributed according to the Pareto law; though little theoretical significance has been given to this particular law, it has been found to describe
the upper end of income distributions in various times and places remarkably
well.
The constant elasticity progression rule can even be extended quite naturally to a negative income tax: the exemption level is then merely the income level at which the tax switches from negative to positive. Adoption
of such a principle of progression, at least as a starting point, might serve
to moderate the somewhat arbitrary tinkering with rate schedules that oftef
takes place under existing circumstances.
INCOME TAX PROGRESSION, LOOPHOLES, AND ECONOMIC WASTE

A practical difficulty with any such pattern of progression is that if
strictly adhered to it implies marginal rates at the top of the scale that lead,
under existing definitions of the tax base, to severe inequities and distorting
incentives. Some of these distortions are almost unavoidable under any administrable definition of the tax base, but many if not most of them are the
result of defective definitions of the tax base and are in principle remediable,
though in some instances it is difficult to complete the remedy in any brief
time period without discriminatory infringment on vested interests acquired in
reliance on the continuation of existing provisions. These defects seem to
have been accumulating steadily since the 1920's as the result of piecemeal
tinkering and the application of ad hoc remedies, sometimes to genuine
inequities but often to spurious but equally persuasively argued ones, until
the final result is far beyond what was already described in 1938 by Henry
Simons as a process of "dipping deeply into great incomes with a sieve.""
The game of "loopholes" is indeed played today with such assiduity that
in the upper ranges, at least, the income tax has become regressive rather
than progressive. With nominal rates going up to seventy per cent for the
year 1965, the last for which I have the complete Statistics of Income data, the
maximum average effective rate of the federal income tax was 36.43 per
cent on the 100,000-500,000 dollar bracket, and above that level the effective
rate of tax actually declines to 30.81 per cent on incomes exceeding 1,000,000
dollars.9 Even this is only in terms of that part of total net income actually
reported on tax returns; in addition there are large amounts of income that
go unreported and untaxed. Some of the larger dear-cut omissions fall under
the headings of tax-exempt interest, interest accrued on life insurance, and
accrued capital gains on which income tax will never be paid (the assets
being held or exchanged tax-free until the death of the taxpayer, or donated
to tax-exempt foundations or institutions). If these types of income were included in the computation of the average effective rate, the failure of the
8.

H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 219 (1938).

9.

See APPENDIX, Table II.
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income tax to retain any semblance of effective progression at the top of the
scale would be even more striking.
It is not merely that the loophole game defeats the intent expressed in
the progressive rate schedule, nor even that inequities result between those
more or less able to take advantage of the loopholes, nor that vast quantities
of high priced talent are squandered on the unproductive intricacies of the
game; the most serious aspect of the loophole game is the distortion and
waste that it engenders in the manner in which the economy of the country
is run. Insurance policies are taken out where the insurable interest in itself
would not warrant incurring the inevitable overhead costs; capital best
adapted to riskbearing and equity investment is diverted to government bonds;
unfair and often wasteful competition from manufacturers using facilities
financed with tax-exempt bonds develops; development and exploitation of
limited natural resources is wastefully accelerated; government projects are
made to appear more productive relative to private projects than would be
the case without the tax distortion; internal financing is encouraged beyond
the point at which it conforms to economic needs, with consequent growth
of protean corporate empires and reduction in the vigor of competition; investors are locked in and capital is restrained from seeking the most productive forms and applications. It is not too much to say that in the process
of aborting tax progression, loopholes have as a byproduct reshaped the entire
pattern of our economy, in most cases for the worse.
THE UNPROMISING POLITICS OF INCOME TAX REFORM

It is not difficult, in principle, to devise a progressive income tax that
would be free from the distorting effects on economic activity that inhere in
these various loopholes and indeed that would, through assessment on a cumulative basis over the years, largely eliminate the artificial incentives now
existing for having transactions recorded in one income year rather than
another, or for postponing the realization of income for tax purposes by one
device or another. 10 Such a tax could, indeed, almost completely eliminate
the distorting influence of the tax on many phases of business activity. There
would remain, to be sure, the almost inescapable tendency of the tax to favor
nonmarket as contrasted with market activity, and the stimulus to the "ex10. Briefly, the principle is to consider all payments with respect to an individual's income tax payments as deposits in an interest-bearing tax account and to compute, at the
end of each year, a cumulative tax on the cumulative total of all income realized since
a base starting date, at rates graduated appropriately to the time interval included. The
current payment is then simply the difference between the tax thus computed and the
balance in the tax account. The only additional information required to be carried forward
from year to year consists of the basic starting date, the cumulated income, and the cumulated tax balance; the tax computation is otherwise the same as at present once the taxpayer has been supplied with the set of rates appropriate to his base date. The computations would be much simpler than those required for existing averaging and income
spreading computations, which would be eliminated. Postponement of realization of an
item of income still postpones tax payment, but since interest then fails to accrue in the
tax account the result is simply equivalent to a loan at the stipulated interest rate. See
NV.VICKRFY, supra note 7, at 172-94.
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pense-account" economy resulting from the practical impossibility of dealing

equitably with the wide variety of perquisites and expense account items that
muddy the line between deductible business expenses and personal consumption. But income tax consequences would no longer be of direct concern in

decisions concerning the buying and selling of securities, depreciation accounting, retirement of equipment, or the selection of investments. Many of
the intricacies of the law could, indeed, be eliminated entirely and the sheer
bulk of the internal revenue code cut in half.
To be sure, such a general closing of loopholes would, if existing rates
were maintained, produce a degree of progression that would appear unduly
severe to many of those concerned, though not, perhaps, to most of the majority that approved the existing rate scale. To a naive observer, the obvious
resolution would be to reform the tax base and reduce the progression of the
rates simultaneously so that the net result would be an over-all degree of
progression unchanged or only slightly increased, a much more equitable
distribution of the burden within income classes, and a greatly reduced interference of the tax with the efficiency of the economy. Yet such a resolution
seems hardly to get to the stage of serious discussion, let alone enactment into
law.
Strong forces, indeed, are arrayed against any such reform. First and most
obviously, there are the special interests that draw advantage from particular
loopholes that could hardly be fully compensated by any general reduction in
rates. These include, for instance, the life insurance industry with respect to
interest earnings included in benefits, the oil interests with respect to depletion, and state and local governments with respect to exempt interest.
-Even where, as with the case of tax-exempt interest, possibilities exist for
compensating the interested governments for the loss of the privilege, the
change is resisted vigorously. Perpetuation of an irrational, discriminatory,
and inefficient privilege of long standing, which appears to be capable of indefinite retention, is preferred to the promise of a more explicit subvention
for which the risk of discontinuance would be considered greater, if only
because the arbitrariness and inequity of the compensation payment, though
no greater than that of the exemption, would be more obvious and less firmly
rooted in past practice.
Second, there is the perhaps only subconscious feeling on the part of the
loophole players that it is far easier to hold the line on the maintenance of
a loophole than on the level of progression of the rates. Indeed, given the
inherent limitations on the degree to which future governments can be committed in advance to the continuation of any given policy, there is no way of
assuring that the rate concession granted in exchange for the abolition of the
loopholes would actually be maintained over any future period. And to those
to whom the whole notion of progression of tax rates is anathema because of
the manner in which the existence of such tools enables the majority to
despoil the wealthy minority, loopholes constitute a last bulwark of the defense against such exploitation, so that any loophole, no matter how offensive
to equity or prejudicial to economic efficiency, may become a cherished element in these defenses.
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Third, it is at least possible that the large vested interest of tax lawyers
and tax accountants in their knowledge of the intricacies of the existing code,
and the threat to their livelihood posed by any drastic simplification of the
tax law, lead subconsciously at least to a preference for dealing with tax
problems by introducing new complications and intricacies that will enable
the tax expert to enhance his importance as a guide through the maze, rather
than by basic reform going to the heart of the matter and bringing principle
and practice closer together rather than farther apart. To be sure, few if
any practitioners would consciously advocate complication for its own sake,
but there is a certain satisfaction to be had from working out intricate solutions, defending them against other proposals, and perhaps ultimately working
out an even more intricate compromise. This satisfaction may help to explain the ever mounting weight of the tax law.
More important, however, is the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible,
to carry out a fundamental reform of the tax law over any brief period
without generating windfall gains and losses on a wide scale and in a capricious and inequitable pattern. Not all of those suffering windfall losses
will be those who have in the past enjoyed undue benefits, nor will windfall
gains accrue to individuals relatively overtaxed in the past. Two wrongs
do not make a right, even when the second wrong results from trying to
right the first one. Take as an example the relatively simple case of the tax
exempt security: immediate abolition of the exemption on all such securities
would of course subject the recent purchaser of such securities to an unconscionable capital loss, while on the other hand the elimination of the exemption for future issues only would probably result in a substantial, though
smaller, windfall gain, by reason of the prospective greater scarcity of such
instruments. Methods of gradually increasing the proportion of taxable interest on outstanding government bonds could in principle be worked out to
maintain the relative market values of such securities approximately unchanged. But this would be a rather difficult process to carry out in practice,
because of the problem of predicting the market's attitude toward the future
and because of the difficulty of committing future Congresses to implementing
such a policy. In the field of depletion the problem would be complicated
even more by the far more intricate contractual relationships existing and
the accounting chaos that has developed as a result of nearly fifty years of
special tax privileges.
The difficulty often encountered in attempting to undo a piece of economic
folly is seen in one of its most acute manifestations if one considers the establishment of a proper progression of the individual income tax to include
the reintegration of the corporation income tax in the individual income
tax structure as a method of collecting individual income tax at the source,
as was the case (very roughly) prior to 1936.11 Because of the special relation
of the corporate income tax to investment, any announcement of a prospective reduction in this tax is likely to have a stimulative impact on in11. Before 1936, dividends were exempt from normal tax in the hands of individuals,
the corporation income tax being considered to be a rough collection at source of this
part of the individual tax.
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vestment over and above any consequence via the budgetary balance, so that
during the period of adjustment, the avoidance of inflation on the one hand
and severe monetary stringency on the other would require other tax revenues
to be increased by more than the reduction in the corporation income tax.
This need for a heavier nominal tax burden during the period of transition is
indeed a severe political difficulty, particularly as the burden of the alternative taxes will be more apparent than that of the corporate income tax.
The main difficulty, however, is that of avoiding inequitable and unproductive windfall gains to stockholders. While a great deal has been written
on the long-run incidence of the corporate income tax, it is clear that regardless of what the long-run incidence may be considered to be, in the short
run any sudden reduction in the corporate income tax rate will result in
windfall gains to shareholders. Such windfall gains can largely be avoided
if the reduction in the corporation income tax is carried out over a long
enough period of time, probably ten years or more, and if this reduction is
known in advance so that additional investment can be planned and carried
out at a rate sufficient to maintain a reasonably close approach to equilibrium.
But this is a large order. It requires first that a program of corporate income tax reduction be determined that will do the trick, then that a Congress
undertake to carry out this program, including the necessary increases in
other taxes, that subsequent Congresses honor this commitment, and finally
and most difficult of all to insure, that those responsible for making investment decisions actually have confidence that the commitment will be carried
out and make their investment decisions accordingly. In addition, during
the transition period the increased incentives for taxpayers to attempt to
shift taxable corporate income to later years by one device or another so as
to enjoy the reduced rates will generate severe pressures on the tax administration. Given the popularity of the corporate income tax as the tax nobody
pays (and indeed it can be argued that the tax is not, in fact, paid by any of
the current generation, but by future generations of wage earners whose productivity will be lowered by absence of the equipment with which to work
that is not installed currently because of the tax), the prospects for any such
rectification of the tax structure seem dim indeed.
ALTERNATIVES

The income tax is sick, and the prognosis is unfavorable. But there are
other progressive taxes to be considered besides the income tax. A possible
alternative approach would be to discard entirely the upper portions of the
progressive income tax scale and replace it with other forms of progressive
taxation. The obvious candidate for this replacement would be a graduated
expenditure tax. While the complete replacement of the income tax by an
expenditure tax would pose formidable administrative and compliance problems, partial replacement may be a fairly attractive proposition. If the
expenditure tax exemption levels were set to correspond roughly with the
income tax exemption levels of the 1920's, the taxpayers involved would be
largely taxpayers itemizing deductions and having moderately involved prob-
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lems with their current income tax; for such taxpayers the problem of providing the additional data needed to compute the expenditure tax would be
a relatively minor one. It is perhaps not too much to hope that an expenditure tax could be kept relatively free of the type of special-interest provisions
with which the income tax has been encrusted; not only can a fresh start be
made, but hopefully the temptations to grant special treatment to this or
that type of expenditure are fewer and less likely to engender economic waste
than the temptations to give special treatment to specific forms of income.
Outside the always vexing area of expenditures on the borderline between
business and personal expense, the concept of personal expenditure seems to
be easier to grasp than that of income.
An expenditure tax, however, leaves relatively untouched the really large
aggregations of wealth and income that far outstrip any urge to spend on
personal consumption and represent to a large extent the sheer accumulation
of economic power. While some may be content to leave these accumulations
to fructify in the hands of the accumulators, others will feel that more of a
contribution to the public purse can properly be exacted than will come from
an expenditure tax and a base-rate income tax, either simply in terms of some
concept of ability to pay, or in terms of attempting to curb the development
of concentrations of economic power that might prove inimical to the
functioning of a democratic society.
At first glance it might appear that the succession taxes12 already perform
this function. On examination, however, it becomes evident that the loopholes
in the income tax are nothing compared with those of the succession taxes.
Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the bulk of the revenue
derived from the upper reaches of the estate tax constitutes a quasi-voluntary contribution from decedents too short-sighted or indifferent to take the
requisite steps to avoid the tax. Nor do the prospects for plugging these loopholes on any wide scale seem bright. While it is possible to devise a form
of succession duty that will make the burden reasonably independent of
artificial or accidental variations in the manner in which wealth is passed
from one generation to another, the method by which this can be done is
13
fairly involved, and represents a sharp departure from existing practice;
moreover no method has yet been devised for dealing in a satisfactory and
nondiscriminatory way with transfers to or from persons outside the taxing
jurisdiction. Reinforcing the succession taxes to take over the progressive
function of the upper reaches of the income tax thus seems an unlikely
prospect.
A better instrument for this purpose would be an annual tax based on
the net worth of the taxpayer, at graduated rates. The problem of ad12. The term "succession taxes" is here meant to include all forms of estate, inheritance,
and gift tax.
13. This involves converting accumulations during a decedent's lifetime into a quantity
termed "bequeathing power" and conceptually allowing this bequeathing power to be
passed from hand to hand unchanged, but collecting as a tax the difference between the
amount of wealth a given amount of bequeathing power is deemed to represent in the
hands of the older testator or donor and the wealth it is deemed to represent in the hands
of the younger recipient, according to appropriate formulas and tables.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol20/iss4/2

10

1968]

Vickery: The Problem of Progression

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESSION

ministering this tax on a large scale would of course be formidable, but if
it is regarded primarily as a substitute for the top rates of the income tax,
it can be applied on the basis of a fairly large exemption, say 200,000 dollars
(roughly the current equivalent of the federal estate tax exemption of the
1920's) and the number of taxpayers kept to a level that makes fairly sophisticated procedures acceptable. The advantage of the net worth tax is
not only that it would start out free from accumulated impairments, but
that when carried to a corresponding level of progression, it is inherently less
likely to cause efficiency-reducing repercussions than is the corresponding income tax. This can be seen most clearly by reference to examples in which
the tax is carried to levels considerably beyond what would be likely to happen in practice, as follows.
Suppose an individual is earning eight per cent on the last $1 million of
his assets, or 80,000 dollars. If this were subject to a marginal income tax
rate of eighty per cent, the tax payable would be 64,000 dollars, and the incentive to sacrifice some or all of this income in favor of nontaxable returns
or satisfactions would be considerable. If on the other hand the income
tax is limited to a maximum rate of, say, forty per cent and a net worth tax
at a marginal rate of 3.2 per cent is imposed instead, the total tax burden
is the same, but the incentives for distortion of activity into wasteful or inefficient channels are greatly reduced. To consider an even more extreme
case, if the net worth tax were raised to five per cent, at the margin, the total
tax would be 82,000 dollars, equivalent to an income tax of 102.5 per cent.
An income tax at this level would be obviously absurd, since the result would
be simply to lead the taxpayer to abandon or sabotage all income above the
point where the rate reached 100 per cent. With the net worth tax, unless
local government bonds are made exempt from this tax as well as the income
tax, there is much less opportunity for avoidance.
These extremes are presented not to advocate that any such rates be
applied in practice but to illustrate more forcefully the advantages of making
use of a net worth tax. To some, of course, this superiority in terms of lack
of adverse impact on the efficiency of the economy may be precisely the
greatest disadvantage involved in such an innovation: as long as the adverse
effects of progression are severe, this fact protects the wealthy taxpayer from
progression being carried beyond a given point; abate the deleterious repercussions and he is less well protected.
Aside from the economics of such a tax, there is the rather serious legal
question whether such a tax could be levied at the federal level without another constitutional amendment, since it might well be held to fall under
the constitutional proscription against direct taxes. One possible way out
would be to levy the tax nominally on the net income deemed to be derived
from the net worth, there being a rebuttable presumption that the income,
for this purpose, amounted to a standard percentage of the net worth. The
taxpayer attempting such a rebuttal would be required to use a very inclusive
definition of net income, including accruals of unrealized capital gains, imputed income from equity in durable consumer goods, and the like. Stating
the tax in this way, though conceptually a bit awkward, would have the con-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

11

Florida
Review,
Vol.REVIEW
20, Iss. 4 [1968], Art. 2[Vol. XX
UNIVERSITY
OFLaw
FLORIDA
LAW
siderable advantage, from some points of view, of protecting the wealthy
minority somewhat against excesses of progression, since it would be relatively easy to block the enactment of rates applicable to the pseudo-net income
derived from net worth, which when added to the rates applicable to actual
net income would combine to rates over 100 per cent. Since the standard
presumed rate of return would tend to be set considerably lower than rates
of return generally realized, in order to minimize cases of successful rebuttal
of the presumption, the net effect would be to limit the progression to a
maximum level considerably short of the "window-dressing" levels reached
by the nominal bracket rates of income taxes in the past. The baneful effects
of the rates at the top end of the progression would be substantially less than
those produced by a comparable degree of effective progression derived from
the income tax alone.
States, to be sure, are for the most part constitutionally empowered to
levy an explicit net worth tax. There is not much to be looked for in this
direction, however, for states generally derive relatively much less revenue
from the upper end of their progressive income tax rate scales than does the
federal government, and given the mobility of wealthy individuals among
states, there is little likelihood of any great change in this situation.
SUMMARY

The complex of political forces impinging on the formulation of our progressive tax system has, indeed, produced a monstrosity that can hardly be
given high marks either as to effective progression and equity on the one hand
or as to maintenance of economic efficiency on the other. While the situation
could in principle be remedied quite adequately within the general rubric
of the income tax, political prospects for doing this are not bright. It is perhaps an appropriate time to give serious consideration to the introduction of
expenditure and net worth taxes as components of the progressive tax structure that might enable the deadlock to be broken so that the drag of the tax
system on the efficiency of the nation's economy can be reduced.
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